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Harassing Program Meets Third Defeat
Institute Complainant Beaten In Illinois Court
Supreme Court Again Sustains National Association
STATE OF ILLINOIS
ss.

COUNTY OF COOK

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
IN CHANCERY

EDWARD E. GORE,
Complainant
vs.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
a Corporation, and
C. R. CARPENTER,
Defendants.

No. B 83081

Be it remembered that heretofore, to wit, on the 10th day of July, A. D., 1922, before the
Honorable Huge H. Friend, one of the judges of said court, the following proceedings were had:

APPEARANCES:
Messrs. McKinney, Lynde 8c Grear
By Mr. Cornelius Lynde,
appeared for the Complainant.
Mr. George E. Dierssen, Assistant Attorney-General,
appeared for the Attorney-General.

Messrs. Maddock, Jaffe 8c Green,
By Mr. Thomas H. Maddock, and
Mr. Charles H. Bryce,

appeared for the defendants.
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MR. DIERSSEN: If it please the
Court this matter comes up on motion
of the Attorney General for leave to
file an intervening petition in this case.
Your Honor undoubtedly remembers
sufficient of the facts, it is the suit
brought by Edward F. Gore against
the National Association of Certified
Public Accountants and C. R. Carpen
ter, one of the officers.
Mr. Gore alleges in his bill that he
is a resident of the State, took the ex
amination and duly qualified as a Cer
tified Public Accountant under the
laws of the State of Illinois, and words
to the effect that it is of the very high
est importance to a man who is a pub
lic accountant to have the title of, or
the certificate or diploma of, a Certi
fied Public Accountant, because it
shows a very high degree of efficiency
in that profession, and to permit any
one to come into this State and give
examinations and issue such certificates
would deprive him of certain rights he
has and would be against public policy
of the State and also against the pub
lic interest. A temporary injunction
on that petition was issued by this
court and I think subsequently the
matter came up on motion to dissolve
the injunction.
The Attorney General takes the po
sition this being a matter of public in
terest and statutory to such an extent,
the public policy of this State is such,
that we could not permit anyone to
come into this State and to issue cer
tificates of this kind, because it would
be a fraud not only upon the people
of the State, but also upon those who
have the necessary qualifications and
who took the necessary examination
and went through the proper pro
cedure as required by our statutes to
obtain that certificate.
THE COURT: As I remember it
that question did not come up directly
in this proceeding, it was a question
of whether the defendants should be
restrained from holding examinations—
MR. DIERSSEN: Issuing certifi
cates is a result of these examinations.
THE COURT: Of course the is
suing of the certificates would not take
place unless—
MR. DIERSSEN: It would be
based upon that examination.
THE COURT: This is a Wash
ington corporation?
MR. DIERSSEN: It is incorpo
rated as a corporation not for profit
under the laws of the District of Co
lumbia. Every State as I have alleged
in the intervening petition has laws
governing Certified Public Account
ants. Of course the District of Co
lumbia did not, but they have incor
porated as a corporation not for pe
cuniary profit; but since the filing of
this bill as I have alleged in the inter
vening petition the United States At
torney for the District of Columbia
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has filed in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia a bill asking for
an injunction to restrain this corpora
tion from operating in the manner al
leged in the Bill of Complaint in this
case, alleging further that under the
laws of the District of Columbia they
were not authorized to issue certifi
cates because the corporations that
are authorized to issue certificates and
diplomas are organized under a dif
ferent section of their statutes. Then,
of course, they allege the point and
set it up in detail with various copies
of instruments showing this corpora
tion does not in good faith conduct its
examinations, they do not require the
individual to possess the requirements
which would generally be asked of
men who are public accountants before
such certificates would be issued to
them.
Now it is purely within the discre
tion of the Court as to whether the
petition of intervention should be al
lowed in this case. Here is a case
which is pending in this Court brought
by one of the individuals who may
perhaps be regarded as damaged by
conduct such as has taken place in this
case and with the public interest in
volved I think the people of the State
could very readily be regarded as nec
essary parties in this proceeding so
there should be a full and proper hear
ing of the case.
THE COURT: Would that change
the legal aspects of the case in any
way, the bringing by the Attorney
General as an intervener into these pro
ceedings?
MR. DIERSSEN: It would be
practically the same thing, the law
governing would be the same. The
only question which might be raised
here would be whether the individual
situated as the complainant in this
case it has a right to bring such ac
tion. I am not passing upon that at
all, I have not looked into it, but I
do feel it is of sufficient importance to
see that the Court has the assistance
of the State as well as of the indi
vidual in a case of this kind.
THE COURT: What is the defend
ant’s position on that?
MR. DIERSSEN: I might read
one case if the Court cares to hear it
about giving leave to file an interven
ing petition—
(Reads from 79th Ill., 385. From
page 387.)
THE COURT: I guess there is no
question about the general proposition
that the Court may allow interveners
to come in.
MR. DIERSSEN: If they have an
interest in the proceeding.
THE COURT: The only thing in
my mind is this, whether the granting
of the motion to allow the Attorney
General to intervene would in any way
change the legal aspects of the case.
We argued the matter rather fully on
the motion to dissolve the injunction.
I read sometime ago, I do not remem

ber exactly all the points that were
made, except I know I came to the
conclusion that I thought the injunc
tion ought to be dissolved, principally
on the ground that the complainant
has no property right. I do not be
lieve there is such a thing as a prop
erty right in a profession of that kind,
any more than there is any right to
practice law or medicine, and I think
this is very much in the same class.
In that situation I doubt whether filing
an intervening petition and argument
on it would change the situation. One
or two other points were argued about,
one or two other points the defendant
made I thought had a rather impor
tant bearing on the proceeding, but
the briefs are in here and I can re
fresh my memory.
MR. DIERSSEN: That would be
one of the things in this case, whether
the complainant has sufficient property
right in the degree so that he can file
a petition in the Court and have any
one else restrained from operating, but
that of course could not be true of
the State of Illinois. I think if there
is anyone who has the right to bring
a proceeding of this kind it would be
the State, particularly where fraud is
practiced as we claim in granting and
issuing certificates of this kind by this
corporation.
MR. BRYCE: I do not wish to in
terrupt, but your intervening petition
does not set up an act of fraud but
says someone else has.
MR. DIERSSEN: I set up this fact,
that the United States Attorney has
filed a bill, giving the name and num
ber of the case, in which he made cer
tain allegations, and the bill was
sworn to, and because under that bill
a temporary injunction was issued.
MR. BRYCE: That rule to show
cause which has not been disposed
of—
MR. DIERSSEN: After argument
however because the matter was ar
gued before the Court before the in
junction was issued. A number of al
legations were set up there which I
am frank to say at the present time
I would not be in a position to prove
showing how certificates were issued
to people who took no examination
whatsoever.
MR. BRYCE: May I say to Your
Honor there is one case in the books
very similar to this. It was a case
where the Attorney General of Illi
nois sought to intervene in same pri
vate litigation. The private litigation
was the foreclosure of a mortgage on
the Chicago and Northern Pacific Rail
road Company by the Farmers’ Loan
& Trust Company. There was a de
fense set up by the company and I
think by an intervening body of stock
holders that the Farmers’ Loan &
Trust Company had not complied with
the statutes of Illinois authorizing for
eign trust companies to do business in
this State. As in this case they pro
cured the co-operation of the Attor
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ney General. I say that the interven
tion of the Attorney General was pro
cured in this case because the petition
is written on the stationery of the
solicitors for the complainant in this
case and typed by the same machine
apparently. The water marks are the
same and I am informed by Mr. Mad
dock the copy was served by the office
of the solicitor of the complainant.
MR. DIERSSEN: If the Court
please that would be immaterial in
this question because I was too busy
myself and I asked them to write it
up and we went over it together.
MR. BRYCE: The Attorney Gen
eral in this Farmers’ Loan & Trust
Company case sought to intervene set
ting up that the Farmers’ Company
had not complied with the laws of Illi
nois' and was not entitled to do busi
ness and was not entitled to foreclose,
taking the same position that the com
pany and its allied interests were
taking.
I am reading from the 68 Federal,
the case of the Farmers’ Loan & Trust
Company versus Chicago & Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, 68 Federal
412 and I shall read from page 417.
(Reading.)
The subject matter of the contro
versy here can only be the property
rights of Edward E. Gore. We have
tried to demonstrate to Your Honor
that Edward E. Gore has no property
rights. I do not believe he has any.
If he has any they are so remote as
not to come within the purview of the
Courts’ injunctive jurisdiction; but if
Edward E. Gore has any property
right what interest has the State of
Illinois in that property right of Ed
ward E. Gore? It cannot have any.
THE COURT: Is there any pro
vision in this Act for any penalty for
practicing as a Certified Public Ac
countant without a proper certificate?
MR. DIERSSEN: Yes. It says
anyone practicing as a Certified Pub
lic Accountant or holding himself out
as such, which is what these people*
claim they have a right to issue these
diplomas for. It is alleged in the other
case and we have adopted that bill.
MR. BRYCE: The last paragraph
of the Act provides that anyone hold
ing a C. P. A. from this State, au
thorized by this Act, or from any other
State, may come in here and practice
as a C. P. A.
THE COURT: You mean that pro
vision of the Statute there?
MR. BRYCE: Yes, but ahead of
that there is a penal clause for one not
authorized, section 6 of the act. (Read
ing.)
THE COURT: That is really the
recourse of the State.
MR. DIERSSEN: To a certain ex
tent I will grant that, if anyone would
who has no certificate of any kind,
hold himself out to be a C. P. A. he
can be punished, but in this case what
recourse has an individual to fight a
corporation which claims they have

the right to issue diplomas? When
they have no such right and are per
petrating a fraud upon the people.
MR. MADDOCK: You can test
that out under the statute here, when
they are arrested.
MR. BRYCE: Even if we go the
whole length and say Your Honor has
the right to allow them to intervene,
what would you be doing? What
would be changed? You would be
changing a proceeding brought by Ed
ward E. Gore to protect his own prop
erty interest into an information in
fact of quo warranto to test out the
powers of foreign corporations, to go
after the internal management of for
eign corporations, and that is inhibited
in a court of equity.
THE COURT: That appeals to me
as a statement of the situation.
MR. LYNDE: May I say that the
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company case
with which I am familiar has nothing
to do with this, it was a foreclosure for
securities and has no other phase. If
the court applies the well recognized
rule, we are not desiring here or argu
ing against the fact that there must be
an interest in the intervener. The sub
ject matter there was a proceeding in
rem. The Court properly held the
State of Illinois had no interest in that
proceeding. Furthermore by a little
analysis it will be seen that Judge
Jenkins held that here the Farmers’
Loan & Trust Company was before the
Court properly in a representative ca
pacity, representing the holders of the
securities and they were practically
before the court and the court would
not enforce the strict formal rule as
set forth in the statute against the hold
ers of those securities. It appealed to
the Court’s conscience in that manner.
If that case had been fraud in Illi
nois the Court under the decisions in
this state, the Court’s decision would
have been otherwise, because the pro
visions of the Illinois statute are per
fectly clear that the execution of securi
ties as shown in that case are void, but
Judge Jenkins refused to adhere to
that rule by reason of the difficulties in
the situation.
Now that has nothing to do with
this case here. We are proceeding
against individuals not in rem. We
are seeking to estop these individuals
from proceeding in certain acts set
forth in the bill, which the Attorney
General says is up to the good faith
of this State to direct. That is the
averment that shows the interest of
the Attorney General. The degree this
complainant has is given by this state
and is worth something according to
the affidavits submitted. There is no
evidence against that you will observe.
I have this thought, that this de
fendant corporation comes into this
State doing things that are reprehen
sible. They claimed they had certain
rights under their charter. We have
presented a decision, not a final one,
that they have no corporate authority
—that is in the District of Columbia
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—no authority to do these things. That
must be the basis of the temporary in
junction in the proceeding in Wash
ington and the records are here to show
by examination if necessary.
That is the situation. They have no
defense or justification for these acts.
Your Honor has intimated the only
doubt in this situation is as to the prop
erty right. We have offered evidence
to show the property right. We have
submitted and we have other. I sub
mit under this situation where there is
no possible harm, inasmuch as they
are enjoined in Washington anyway,
this injunction should not be dissolved.
If there is a final decision in Wash
ington that they have corporate au
thority to do these things that situa
tion must be presented here, but until
the Washington Court has ruled they
have some property authority to do
these things which are clearly against
our rights and against public policy of
this State, the injunction should con
tinue.
That is the situation before Your
Honor as a practical one. The only
difference is whether we have to go
up with a decree without the injunc
tion or with the injunction, or whether
Your Honor continues the matter un
til there is a disposition of the Wash
ington bill.
THE COURT: Is that set out in
your intervening petition, all these
things?
MR. BRYCE: Half of the facts as
to the Washington suit are set out.
We are talking now about what is be
fore this Court and not the Wash
ington bill.
Mr. LYNDE:
We present the
Washington bill, if there is any doubt
about that I will offer on behalf of
the Complainant a certified copy of
the petition for injunction.
MR. BRYCE: We will object to
that of course as not proper now.
THE COURT: What does the in
junction here restrain the defendant
from doing.
MR. LYNDE: Holding examina
tions in this State to serve as a basis
for certificates.
MR. BRYCE: The prayer of the
bill for injunction goes further than
that.
MR. LYNDE: The prayer is for
an injunction as prayed and that is the
order. The bill of complaint has a
prayer for a general injunction and
also for a preliminary injunction.
THE COURT: It is just general in
terms of the language in the bill.
MR. BRYCE: What I would say
about the 217 Illinois, page 371. I am
reading from page 377 where the Court
discusses the right of intervention and
says, beginning on page 375. (Read
ing.)
Assuming they could be brought in,
were the people of the State of Illinois
ever proper parties in this suit, ever
have any interest in this suit, any prop
erty interest? It is all right to say in-
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terest. Yes the people of the State of
Illinois have a sort of fatherly interest
which is getting wider and wider every
day over all of us, but have they any
property interest in this suit?
Suppose there was a statute in this
State allowing people to be sued. If
people were sued in this State, what
interest have they? Their interest is
only in the enforcement of criminal
law. That is their only interest in
this case, and we argued and demon
strated in this case that a plea in
equity will not lie to prevent a crim
inal act. It is not a criminal act under
this statute to be issuing degrees. It
may be beyond its power, ultra vires,
but that is nothing to the State of
Illinois, that is something for the Dis
trict of Columbia to consider. That is
something they say the District of
Columbia is considering and issued a
temporary injunction. That temporary
injunction was issued without answer
filed just as this one was.
THE COURT: This is the way it
would work out, isn’t it? Supposing
the reviewing court in Washington or
this Court would say that the injunc
tion would be made permanent or the
decree confirmed on the ground that
the corporation under its charter has
no power to issue certificates. Then
if any accountant who got a certificate
under the charter came into Illinois and
tried to practice on the ground he
had a certificate from the National
Association in Washington, then he
would be practicing without any license
because the Court there holds there
is no authority to issue licenses and
he could be prosecuted then under the
penal clause of our statute, because he
would be in the same position as a man
who comes in without any license of
any kind and holds himself out as a
certified public accountant, and is sub
ject to all the penalties of that Act.
It seems to me if the contention of
the defendant is right and this Court
would refuse to dissolve the injunction
that the reviewing Court would hold
that it was error. I feel very well sat
isfied on that point.
This is a proper proceeding and is
based on the ground the Court has
jurisdiction and it is an equitable mat
ter and the complainant Gore has a
property right here and is properly in
equity and the case is argued on that
basis. Now if you are going by this
intervening petition to change the en
tire complexion of this proceeding and
make a public matter out of it then
you have again the question of whether
a Court of equity can hear and enter
tain an intervener’s petition here on
the point counsel has made, that by
the very intervening petition here the
Court is now out of it. The State has
come in and says we want to know
by what right these people are issuing
licenses. It seems to me that makes
an entirely dififerent proposition out
of it, and it is on that basis, on that
question, that I do not believe a Court
of equity would have jurisdiction to en
tertain it.
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MR. DIERSSEN: We have done
that in insurance cases where a pri
vate individual has gone in and the
State has gone in and filed an inter
vening petition because it is claimed
insurance is a public interest, for the
protection of the policy holders.
THE COURT: You will find in
some proceedings the State has a real
interest and under the statutes has a
right. For instance in your security
law if a person undertakes to sell se
curities without permission the Attor
ney General under the exact language
of the statute can file an information
and estop them because that is a matter
in which the State is really interested
and is only interested by virtue of the
wording of the statute. Otherwise it
probably would not come in.
But here is a purely personal pro
ceeding between two persons, an in
dividual and a corporation, and you
are trying to come in on that as an.
intervener and thereby claim that you
are a necessary party, for that would
be the only theory upon which you
could intervene.
MR. DIERSSEN: We are a proper
party for this reason. If the Court
would hold these people have a right
and dismiss the bill, they would say
in Illinois they were given permission,
tacit permission, to hold these exami
nations.
MR. BRYCE: That is the trouble
with the complainant’s case, presuming
certain things are true because they
have been done.
THE COURT: The only angle
which the Court can consider is the
legal right of the Attorney General to
intervene here.' Whether the Court
might have power to permit him to
intervene is a matter of discretion, but
I think it would be an abuse of discre
tion. I really do not think the Attor
ney General is a necessary or proper
party to this proceeding.
MR. DIERSSEN: To protect the
public.
THE COURT: No, I think the At
torney General’s recourse is under an
other statute, the penal sections of the
statute. Whenever the matter is de
termined in Washington as to whether
or not the defendant here has a right
to issue licenses. Then the Attorney
General if that Court holds they have
no right to issue licenses and they come
in here without a license and tries to
practice public accountancy then the
Attorney General may step in and
prosecute. Until that time this is not
a public matter in the sense the At
torney General might be permitted to
intervene in litigation between two pri
vate persons.
MR. LYNDE: If Your Honor
please, I submit the Court has not
quite got, undoubtedly due to my inef
ficiency, the position of the complain
ant, and I submit of the people of
Illinois in this case. Your Honor
talked in the beginning of the remarks
you have just made of the right of the

complainant to keep other people from
practicing here.
That is not what we are here to
argue. I had a transcript prepared of
the argument before and in that Your
Honor made similar statements, and I
referred to it in the bill. I want to
show just what Your Honor had in
mind because to me it is the basic sit
uation here.
There was some discussion in the ar
gument before as to an Illinois case,
the Lincoln Protective Bureau case,
and Your Honor made this comment:
“That is an unfair competition case,
in other words, the Court decides there
that these people had, the Lincoln Pro
tective Bureau, had built up a business
and some one else was trying to take
it and appropriate it.”
I said, “That is very possible here,”
and Your Honor said, “There is noth
ing like that here, etc.”
Now, Your Honor, they are talking
about other people coming to practice
this profession. This is a trade desig
nation and very important here, given
here to people who complied with cer
tain statutory requirements and is of
value.
THE COURT: It would be the
same as a lawyer.
MR. LYNDE: No, Your Honor,
the distinction is this, no one can prac
tice law without going through certain
formalities which vary in the different
States, and no one can practice law
and do the things required without get
ting a certain basis required before the
courts. Anybody can practice public
accounting if desired, no preliminary
requirement of any kind by law or any
thing else. Just sell your services.
THE COURT: It comes down to
this, in order to be a petitioner in
equity you must show a property right
and you are contending this is a prop
erty right. I think that would be
stretching the question pretty far to
say that a Certified Public Accountant
has such a property right, statutory
property rights in his profession.
MR. LYNDE: No, Your Honor, let
me please emphasize the distinction. A
public accountant has a right to prac
tice his profession whether a Certified
Public Accountant or not. There is
nothing in the statute that gives him
that right. The only thing he gets by
the statute is to be entitled to hold
himself out as a Certified Public Ac
countant and use that designation.
That is all this statute does and it does
not do anything more than that. It
says if some one wants to rate himself
as a Certified Public Accountant by
complying with the statute he can do it.
THE COURT: However, he gets
his right through the statute of claim
ing it, not any other way is he given
the name, Certified Public Accountant.
MR. LYNDE: It is a trade-mark,
not a license to practice but a trade
mark indicating he has certain business
capacity and experience.
THE COURT: You have called it
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a trade-mark but it is not some per
sonal individual right he has, not the
same as a trade-mark—
MR. LYNDE: Take the Minne
apolis flour case—
THE COURT: He is in quite a
different position it seems to me, but
he is not in any different position than
a plumber or anyone else.
MR. LYNDE: Just take the plumb
er’s case then. No one can be a
plumber without getting a license. That
is not the situation. Anyone can be a
public accountant and do whatever
things a Certified Public Accountant
does, without any statutory designa
tion; but if he wants to use the trade
designation of Certified Public Ac
countant, that is a trade designation
and an accepted one, and he must com
ply with the statute in manner set
forth.
The question therefore in the Court’s
mind is this. If that statute said one
individual had a right to that particular
trade designation there would be no
question of our right to intervene in
equity; it would be like any other trade
mark, if we had it registered for a
particular brand and have it up under
some statutory or other authority, no
one would contend I am sure that
we did not have a right to come into
equity and ask the Court to enjoin
others from using that brand or desig
nation. Without question I think the
other people should have done the
same thing we have and gained the
right to use that designation. Then
it would keep us from coming in to
protect our rights.
Now take the Minneapolis flour case,
that is an analogous situation. They
have a number of manufacturers but
the bill does not even say “all.” The
Court said that no one else in Minne
apolis could use that name, and yet
they enjoined someone else from
wrongfully using it, no question about
that if it is wrongfully taken. We
are not enjoining some one person, we
are going to the source of this thing.
The statute does prevent individuals
and who are not before this Court from
doing those things and makes their
acts criminal. We are trying to stop
the source of this proposition. We
have before this Court as it seems to
me a clear right to protect the trade
designation.
Your Honor must remember that the
woods are full of public accountants
practicing public accountancy doing the
same things as the complainant here,
but they have not the right to use that
particular designation at all until they
have complied with the requirements
of the statute or a similar statute in
other States. We have presented affi
davits that this particular thing is of
value. It is recognized as having a
particular value by the United States
Government. I have here the require
ments of the Civil Service Account
ants, they have Junior Accountants
and Senior Accountants, etc. In or
der to be a Senior Accountant you must

show yourself to be a Certified Public
Accountant. If that is not conclusive
proof of the value of the designation
I do not know what is.
MR. BRYCE: The real issue gets
down to this section 8 of the Bill of
Complaint. (Reading.) There is noth
ing in the law of Illinois to prevent
them from doing it. It is the persons
who attempt to practice who will dam
age them.
THE COURT: That brings you
back to the section of the statute which
says that nothing herein contained
which shall prevent a certified public
accountant who is the lawful holder,
etc. That is the proposition you have
in mind?
MR. BRYCE: I have the prayer of
their bill, it is the action of the per
sons who may take this examination—
“such persons will attempt to practice
public accounting in the State of Illi
nois to the great damage of the com
plainant, etc.”
MR. LYNDE: Counsel has inter
rupted, I am not finished, I am at
tempting to point out to the Court
that this statute is entirely different
from a statute that requires an exami
nation, requires a license. It does not
require a license to carry on the busi
ness, but it does this—it recognizes
that this proposition is important, to
the extent the State has taken juris
diction over it by this statute and that
shows the public interest. If says by
that statute, and that is the plain decla
ration of it, that the public ought to
be protected so they can recognize
those who are competent. That is
clear—assuming it is within the power
of the Legislature to determine that
there is public interest in the things
practiced by that profession, and it is
clearly within the power of the Legis
lature to state in what way our public
shall be protected.
They have determined the particular
way. It happens to be unique, it is
not the ordinary way. What .they do
is this—they say we will let anybody
practice this profession that wants to.
That is clearly the meaning of that
statute, no question about that; but
for the protection of the public we will
pick out special ones and give them a
special designation, first finding out
whether they are qualified and only
those properly qualified shall be per
mitted to use that designation.
That is what that statute says and
it creates that particular designation.
Now why would an individual go to
the trouble of obtaining that designa
tion except to use it in a professional
way? They desire to obtain that des
ignation set apart by the Legislature
for the protection of the public be
cause it is of value, it is a business
proposition. It is not sentimental or
patriotic but is strictly a business prop
osition. A man must comoly with that
statute to obtain that title so he may
use it in that way.
Now any individual in the United
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States has a right to come in and do
'the things involved, sell their services
just as the other men who have a right
to use that designation, but they can
not hold themselves out to the public
as having by statute the use of that
designation except by complying with
the statute.
My contention is that that is a trade
designation shown to be of value by
the statute itself and it is incompetent
for anyone to argue before the Court
in the face of that that the statute or
designation is not of value. We are
here, to protect that showing that there
is a, business value.
MR. BRYCE: May I ask if it is
necessary to reargue or discuss the
motion to dissolve, or whether we are
confining ourselves to the matter be
fore the Court here of the Attorney
General’s petition.
COURT: I understand your
position, Mr. Lynde, but I do not see
that the question of whether the statute
requires, a public accountant to take
out a license when it does require other
professional men to take out licenses,
is the determining point. The mere
fact it creates that trade ,name, it does
not seem to me that creates public
right in that man which would permit
him to come into a court of equity and
prohibit anyone else except those, qual
ified to pursue that prqfession in this
State. I read your brief and I read
quite a number of cases and I have
thought that over and I cannot bring
myself to feel that the complainant has
such a property right as would entitle
him to maintain his bill. That is the
conclusion I have definitely comedo. I
feel it would be stretching the powers
of the Court in equity a long way to
permit that.
That brings us to the question of
whether there is any different situation,
here on the motion of the Attorney
General to file his intervening peti
tion. I think about all that has beensaid on that—I do not know whether,
you gentlemen care to add anything
but it seems to me clear that the At
torney General by asking to file his
intervening petition is trying to change
or would change the nature of the
proceeding entirely. He was not a
necessary party in the first place and
therefore could not be made so by the
filing of his intervening petition.
You can say that anything is of pub
lic interest in a sense, and whatever
the public interest there is it is here
defined in the act, and if the Attorney
General feels these people—any of
them who are not in here properly—
then under the penalty clause the At
torney General could or should prose
cute "them, but that is as far as the
public interest goes, and I do not think
there is any further public interest
than that, that is how it seems to me.
MR. DIERSSEN: That would not
help the situation at all, forty-eight
States have laws governing that but
the District of Columbia has not.
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THE COURT: It will be deter
mined by the District of Columbia
shortly whether or not this corpora
tion under its powers and charter has
a right to issue licenses. That will de
termine it, they cannot come in and
practice. If they decide they have then
I think you will agree that the Attor
ney General could not prosecute them
under that penal clause.
MR. DIERSSEN: I am not pre
pared to say whether he would or not.
THE COURT: I do not know, but
that is the way it looks to me. Sup
pose the District of Columbia should
decide the defendant corporation has
power under its charter to issue licenses
and one of the persons to whom the
license is issued should come into Illi
nois and hold himself out as a public
accountant, I think under the wording
of that act, I do not think the Attorney
General could enforce as against that
person the penal clause of the statute.
MR. LYNDE: I think they could
but I would like to be heard on that
when the time arrives. But if Your
Honor please, we have this defendant
enjoined by temporary injunction in
the District of Columbia from doing
these things there, so there is no pos
sible damage to the defendant from
this injunction so long as the injunc
tion there is in force.
THE COURT: There is possible
damage, they cannot hold examinations.
MR. LYNDE: They are enjoined
from doing that by the Washington
Courts.
MR. BRYCE: We are not en
joined from issuing diplomas from ex
aminations held.......... I was going to
suggest that has nothing to do with
the Attorney General’s right to inter
vene.
THE COURT: It does not seem
to me as anything this court should
consider any more than a reviewing
court would. The reviewing court
would look at this question, whether
or not the injunction was properly is
sued and if not whether it should be
dissolved, that is the only thing this
court has a right to look at. As a
practical matter it might be advisable
for you gentlemen to agree that this
matter be determined in Washington
before you proceed here, but that is
not our situation. They are asking
this injunction be dissolved, that is the
only thing this court has a right to
look at. It was issued without notice
and I think under the construction
this court would want to place on
that Act under the allegations in the
Bill and the situation generally, I think
the injunction should be dissolved. I
do not think the Court has any right
to let this injunction remain in force.
MR. LYNDE: If the court please
I want to give the court what the
temporary injunction in Washington
is—
MR. BRYCE: Let me read this, it
is Whiteman versus Yarre, from page
378—(Reading).
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Original proceedings are all that are
left for the Attorney General.
THE COURT: I doubt whether or
not the Attorney General in an origi
nal proceeding here could restrain these
defendants.
MR. DIERSSEN: I can see that is
the point in Your Honor’s mind, that
the court feels if the Attorney General
had made an original proceeding it
would be different. The relief sought
is the same and the parties are the
same. The relief sought would be
the test. In this injunction in the
Supreme Court of the District of Co
lumbia, it reads—(Reads).
.MR. LYNDE: Now, Your Honor,
we have this practical situation. There
is the injunction. There are individ
uals in this state who have these cer
tificates and are mis-using them in
this state and the defendant is en
joined in Washington. I submit it is
more fair and equitable to everyone
concerned that this injunction now
pending continue in force until the
Washington injunction is decided.
Otherwise we are left without protec
tion here, are left without protection
against the individuals who are really
dupes of the criminal conspiracy here.
MR. MADDOCK: That is an un
fair inference.
THE COURT: I do not think this
court has any concern or should con
sider what they are doing in Washing
ton, the question is as to the statutes of
Illinois.
MR. LYNDE: But it shows their
claim of justification as to what they
are doing is denied, it certainly is per
tinent to that extent.
THE COURT: I cannot see it.
No, I think the motion to dissolve
ought to be granted and the motion
to file an intervening petition of the
Attorney General is denied, and you
can draw up an order to that effect.
MR. BRYCE: May we have leave
to file our suggestion of damages? I
do not want to bring them up at the
present time but ask for leave to file
them.
THE COURT: I do not think you
would be entitled to any damages.
MR. BRYCE: As to solicitors’ fees
surely.
THE COURT: I just went into
that question the other day and it
comes up in this way, the injunction
was issued in the first instance and
the motion to dissolve denied and it
went up to the Appellate Court—it
was from another court here. The Ap
pellate Court said the injunction
should be dissolved and the matter
came up on the question of damages.
You can look it up in 151 Appellate,
Seass vs. Monroe, before you take up
the question of damages. That says
where there was cause for issuing the
injunction in the first instance no dam
ages should be allowed under the
statute.
MR. BRYCE: May we incorporate

in the order leave to file?
THE COURT: Yes, that would be
all right.
MR. LYNDE: I suggest we have
some form of final decree disposing of
the matter because I think it will be
the intention of the people I represent
to appeal.
THE COURT: I think so, put it in
such shape as to take care of the entire
matter.
MR. DIERSSEN: So far as the in
tervening petition is concerned it will
be merely an order denying leave, and
not have anything to do with the
decree.
THE COURT: Yes, you can have
a final order here.
MR. BRYCE: That, Your Honor,
we might take up later. Perhaps since
they have been very insistent about
the Washington court they may like
to file a supplemental bill, I do not
know. I think the proper thing to do
now is to dissolve the injunction and
let it go at that.
MR. LYNDE: Whatever the dispo
sition of this petition I want this record
to show—
THE COURT: Mr. Lynde’s point
is this practically determines the pro
ceeding and the record should be put
in such condition they can go up on
it.
MR. LYNDE: The court has heard
the matter on primarily the motion to
dispose of the injunction. I would be
perfectly willing to go into a hear
ing and could offer ample evidence,
but what we want is a determination.
I think the facts are before the court.
I want the record to show that ir
respective of this petition of the At
torney General on behalf of the com
plainant and on the general issue to
dissolve the injunction I am offering
the Bill in the Washington case.
MR. BRYCE: I object because it
was not made at the time. We have
a transcript of what transpired and
can find out what was offered, and that
should be in your certificate and noth
ing else, I do not believe in nunc pro
tunc offers.
MR. MADDOCK: That was not
before the court when the injunction
was granted.
MR. LYNDE: I would like Your
Honor to rule on that. I am making
that offer now at this stage of the
proceeding as additional evidence in
opposition to the motion to dissolve
the injunction. I submit it is in the
discretion of the court to permit evi
dence to be admitted at any time.
THE COURT: I will permit you
to file that.
MR. BRYCE: The record will show
that the offer was made after Your
Honor had announced his decision.
THE COURT: You have a reporter
here—the record will show.

Which were all the proceedings had
on the hearing of said motion.
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STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF COOK ss:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
COOK COUNTY.
EDWARD E. GORE
vs.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT
ANTS OF WASHINGTON, D. C.,
A CORPORATION, and C. R. CAR
PENTER.
No. B-83081

ORDER
This day, coming on to be heard,
the motion of The People of the State
of Illinois on relation of Edward J.
Brundage, Attorney General of said
State for leave to file its intervening
petition herein, and the parties to this
cause appearing by their counsel and
the Attorney General, also appearing
and the Court having considered the
proposed intervening petition and hav
ing considered the pleadings herein and
having heard the arguments of counsel;
IT IS ORDERED that the motion
of The. People of the State of Illinois
on relation of Edward J. Brundage,
Attorney General of said State for
leave to file said intervening petition
be and the same is hereby denied.
Done in open Court this 13th day
of July, A. D. 1922.

STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF COOK ss:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
COOK COUNTY.
EDWARD E. GORE
vs.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT
ANTS OF WASHINGTON, D. C.,
A CORPORATION, and C. R. CAR
PENTER.
ORDER
This cause having heretofore come
on to be heard upon the motion of
solicitors for the defendants that the
temporary injunction heretofore en
tered herein be dissolved and the Court
having read the bill of complaint and
the joint and several answer of the
said defendants and having read the
affidavits submitted by the parties and
having heard the arguments of coun
sel for all parties and considered the
briefs heretofore submitted by them;
IT IS ORDERED that the tempo
rary injunction heretofore and on the
3rd day of March, A. D. 1922, granted
and issued in this cause be and the
same is herewith dissolved; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
the said defendants and each of them
be and they are herewith granted leave
to file their suggestion of damages
herein within five days.
Done in open Court this 13th day
of July, A. D. 1922.
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ANNOUNCEMENTS

BOARD TAKES ACTION

Howard W. Lee, Certified Public
Accountant, N. A., announces the open
ing of his office at 848 Broadway, New
York, N. Y., for the general practice
of public accounting.

Meeting of the Board of Governors
of the National Association of Certi
fied Public Accountants held in the
office of the association July 15, 1922.
The members of the Board of Gov
ernors passed a resolution and for
warded it to Attorneys Messrs. Mad
dock, Jaffe and Green, of Chicago, in
structing them to file in the name of
the association damages against the
plaintiff, Edward E. Gore, in the sum
of $50,000.00 for damages sustained
and business losses caused by the is
suance of the temporary injunction.

Edward Roseman & Co. announces
the removal of their offices to 661
Lexington Building, Phone Plaza
0725, Baltimore, Md.

Washington, D. C., June 17, 1922.
To the Board of Governors,
National Association of Certified
Public Accountants,
Washington, D. C.
Gentlemen:—
In accordance with your instructions,
we have made an examination of the
financial records of the National As
sociation of Certified Public Account
ants and submit herewith the results.
The period under examination was
from June 4th, 1921, to May 31st, 1922,
inclusive.
The receipts for the above period
were:
Initiation Fees, full members $36,265.00
Junior Members........... ...
260.00
Dues from members............. 8,716.00
Subscription to C.' P. A. Bul
letin ................................. 1,420.00
Sale of Furniture and Fixtures
28.50
Repayment of Dishonored
Checks ...........................
185.00
Refund of Exchange.............
6.78
Refund account of Certificate
Expense .........................
3 .25
Refund account of Traveling
Expenses advanced .....
196.35
Refund of Chamber of Com
merce U. S. A. Initiation Fee 60.00
Advertising and Printing....
7.20
Total Receipts................. $47,148.08
The disbursements for the above
period were:
Salaries................................... $24,071.67
General Expenses, including
rent and traveling......... 5,979.58
Advertising and Printing.... 3,417.87
Mail and Express .............. 1,307.03
Certificates including forward
ing of same.................... 6,137.42
Furniture and Fixtures....... 1,116.89
Legal Expenses...................... 2,780.00
Exchange .............................
33.18
Chamber of Commerce Initia
tion Fee .......................
60.00
Returned Checks and Refund
ed Initiation Fees ......... 1,155.00
Petty Cash, not accounted for
at this time ....................
115.87
Total Disbursements . . . .$46,174.51

Balance.................... $

973.57

REPLACEMENTS

The Connecticut Chapter has an idea
for bringing up our Juniors in the way
they should go, to replace the “old
boys” who drop out of line. Here’s
the idea:
Reference or Home Study Courses
have won their place in the field of
education. Many of our successful
practicing accountants today owe to
these Correspondence and Home Study
Courses the education that they would
have otherwise been unable to acquire.
In my opinion, a Reference or Home
Study Course has many advantages
over a residential school; the principal
one being that there is no limit to the
research and supplemental study that a
student can give to his subject, and he
takes up the study as the spirit moves
him, thus absorbing more knowledge
than he would in the daily routine of
a residential school.
The ideal course of instruction, how
ever, is a Correspondence or Home
Study Course, where the student ab
sorbs the theory, combined with class
discussion on the same subject.
The Connecticut Chapter of the Na
tional Association of Certified Public
Accountants is about to inaugurate
such a course.
At the present time this Chapter is
composed of eighty or more success
ful practicing public accountants who
have determined to take accountancy
out of the class of contracting business
and put it in the class of professions,
where it properly belongs. In this class
at their monthly meetings, every ac
tivity of the accountant will be covered
by general discussion, as will also spe
cial lines of business and the auditing
and accounting thereof.
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THE WASHINGTON CASE
The injunction hearing, Equity No.
40086, pending before Justice Hoeh
ling, restraining the National Associa
tion from issuing the C. P. A. Degree,
has been appealed by the defendants to
the Court of Appeals and Review of
the District of Columbia.

DEFENSE FUND

At the annual meeting, it was recom
mended by the members present that
a Defense Fund be raised to take care
of all pending suits and litigation that
may hereafter arise. It was the con
census of opinion of the members
present, that each member of the As
sociation be invited to contribute $5.00
for this special Defense Fund. It takes
money, a great deal of money, to fight
these cases through the Supreme Court
and in order to accomplish our pur
poses, if you have not yet contributed
your $5.00, the committee on Defense
Fund would like to have you do so at
once. This is for a good cause, and if
the 3,000 members will come forward
with their $5.00 each, the Defense Com
mittee will have sufficient funds to
carry all cases to a satisfactory con
clusion.

NEW JERSEY ORGANIZES
The New Jersey State Chapter
the National Association of Certified
Public Accountants was organized on
Tuesday, July 12, at 635 Broad Street,
Newark, N. J.
Constitution and By-Laws were
adopted and the following officers
elected for the coming year:
William W. Williams, President.
F. J. Smith, Vice-President.
H. M. Hardie, Vice-President.
B. E. Antinoph, Vice-President.
A. E. Vickers, Secretary and Treas
urer.
And a Board of Governors consist
ing of above named officers and four
additional members, namely:
Arthur Terry.
A. B. Crummy.
E. W. Schuler.
Ana J. Miller.
The condition of the profession in
the State is to be thoroughly gone into
by the Chapter.

FEES AND DUES
The fee for full membership in the
National Association of Certified Public
Accountants has been advanced to $25.00,
and the annual dues to $10.00.
The following resolution was recom
mended by the members at the annual
meeting and adopted by the Board of
Governors:
Resolved, That the initiation fee for
full members from July 1, 1922, will be
$25.00, and that the said $25.00 initiation
fee shall be divided as follows: If a
Chapter is in formation or has been
formed in the State from which the ap
plication comes, then said Chapter shall
receive $10.00 of said initiation fee. If
no Chapter is in formation or has been
formed, the entire initiation fee shall be
retained by the Washington office, and
$10.00 of the same shall be used to pro
mote the formation of a Chapter in that
State.
Further, That the annual dues shall be
for new members from July 1, 1922,
$10.00 per annum.
IN GENERAL
The National Association will issue
from the Washington office, three forms
of certificates, namely:
Junior Membership:
Initiation fee............................... $10.00
Annual dues................................. 5.00
Fellow Membership:
Initiation fee............................... 25.00
Annual dues................................. 10.00
Full Membership:
Initiation fee............................... 25.00
Annual dues................................. 10.00

Junior Members will be furnished a
course of practical training in Account
ancy which should enable them after
completing the course, to pass to that of
a Fellow Member.

Fellow Members will be known as that

class of accountants who have had sev
eral years’ experience as a public ac
countant, but as yet are not qualified to
pass the C. P. A. examination. This
class of members will be given an in
tense course in Accountancy problems
and auditing which should enable them
to pass any C. P. A. examination.
Full Membership will be issued to ac
countants who hold a C. P. A. Certifi
cate; C. A. Certificate; Licensed Ac
countant ; Auditor who has passed the
Civil Service Examination (highest
grade) ; Accountants who pass the Na
tional Association examination, and have
had three years or more experience as a
public accountant.

C. P. A. BULLETIN
The C. P. A. Bulletin will be known
as the official publication of the National
Association of Certified Public Account
ants, its number of pages will be in
creased from time to time, it will en
deavor to publish matters of interest to
Accountants, it will carry a line of ad
vertisements that will be in keeping with
the professional Accountant, and it will
be issued monthly. Rates for advertise
ments will be made known on application.
Subscription price, $5.00 per year, pay
able in advance.

CLIPPINGS
All newspaper clippings or other print
ed matter for or against the Association
should be forwarded to the Washington
office.
IDENTIFICATION CARD
If you have not received your Identifi
cation Card for 1922, you should remit
for your annual dues and receive this card
at once before you are dropped from the
National roll. Dues for 1922 for appli
cants who became members prior to July
1, 1922, are $5.00. Your Identification
Card will show you are in good standing.

Formerly the Industrial Systems Company, New York

Special Notice
Factory Cost System Reports, $ 5.00 complete, postpaid.
Retail Store System Reports, $10.00 complete, postpaid.
Reorganization, Analysis and System Reports, over 200 pages with over 350
commercial printed, original forcs, $25.00, postpaid.
Your Library and System Service department is not complete unless it is equipped
with the Industrial Systems Manual which will be mailed upon receipt of
$5.00, cash with order.
Mail checks and orders to
IRA W. WOLFE
1331 West 71st St.
System Specialist
Los Angeles, Calif.

